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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2A-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Sandiii Ma*well I Maxwell"I \w identified the issues 
presented to the court and although she has failed to cite to the pages in the trial court record 
where these issues are raised, the Defendants/Appellees, Estate of John S Adams ("Adams 
Estate"), and Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe ("TEA&L") shall respond to those issues. Since 
this case resulted in the lower court granting summary judgment in favor of the Adams Estate 
and TEA&L, the standard of review for the appellate court is to review the trial court's rulings 
under a correction-of-error standard. Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Company, 857 P.2d 250, 
}52 (Utah \\\\\ IW3), Rawlins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Maxwell was the only named plaintiff in the lower court proceeding to assert 
claims against the Adams Estate and TEA&L. Those claims were based upon legal malpractice 
wherein Maxwell alleged that these defendants breached their contract and were negligent in 
representing her interests in an action filed against her and others on October 8, 1985 in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County designated as Civil No. C85-6773 ("Wade 
case"). This case involved real estate identified as the Pepperwood Property and Maxwell 
alleged that because of the breaches of contract and negligence of the Adams Estate and TEA&L, 
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she lost one-half of the property. In this case, Maxwell sought monetary damages against these 
defendants for the loss of this property. The Adams Estate and TEA&L filed a motion for 
summary judgment based upon the grounds that she could not establish by any competent 
evidence the damages she had claimed to have incurred or that she had in fact suffered any 
damages. The lower court granted summary judgment in an order dated April 20, 1995. (Trial 
court record pp. 863, 864, hereinafter citations to trial court record shall be with an R. and the 
page number). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since Maxwell in her "Facts" failed to support her factual statements by citations 
to the trial court record, the facts relevant to the issues presented on this appeal are provided 
below. 
Maxwell's claims against the Adams Estate and TEA&L are set forth in the 
Amended Complaint under the eleventh and twelfth claims for relief and allege that these 
defendants breached their contract and were negligent in representing her interests in an action 
filed against her and others on October 8, 1985 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, designated as Civil No. C85-6773 ("Wade case"). This case involved real estate 
identified as the Pepperwood Property and Maxwell alleged that because of the breaches of 
contract and negligence of the Adams Estate and TEA&L, she lost one-half of the Pepperwood 
Property. In her prayer for relief under the eleventh and twelfth claims, she seeks monetary 
damages against the Adams Estate and TEA&L for the loss of the property. (R. 345,399-
405,415,416 Addendum 1). Since Maxwell's claims are for legal malpractice relating to the 
alleged loss of the Pepperwood property, it is important to understand the history of the property 
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relating to ownership. On April 28, 1970, Advance Business Equipment entered into a uniform 
real estate contract with M v Fisher and Francis Fisher for the purchase of the Pepperwood 
property. Then Advance Business Equipment on February 27, 1976 assigned this uniform real 
estate contract to Sandra I Maxwell. (R 818-821 representing the deposition of Sandra 
Maxwell taken on October 21, 1994, pp. 29,30, hereinafter referred to as the "Maxwell 
deposition", assignment of contract, defendant's Exhibit no. 1 to the Maxwell deposition, 
deposition of Richard urke taken on October 24 and 25, 1994, p. 60, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Burke deposition", Addendum 2.) Maxwell made payments to the Fishers for a period 
warranty deed, conveyed the Pepperwood 
property to Sandra L. Maxwell. (R. 822,823 which represents the Maxwell deposition, p 37, 
jifiil il'fltinlaiif "?i I'.xhibil mi- ," ol ilir Maxwell ilqiiwiHoii Addendum .1 I Ai some time in 1987, 
Richard C. Burke, who was Maxwell's brother, formed a corporation by the name of Trendland, 
Inc. il!""1 Trendland") because iMaivvuil vtiuiicd in \n\\ Ihc prnptTiy unci a atiporati" niliiy lor fhe 
purpose of future develqpment. Then Maxwell conveyed the Pepperwood property to Trendland, 
Inc. by warranty deed on September 23, 148/ In return Ini lliih i nnu'vance, Miivwdl irceiuil 
a majority of the stock in Trendland which she still owns. (R. 824-829 which represents the 
Maxwell deposition pp. 46 and 47, the Burke deposition, pp. I I I . 112 and I and defendant's 
Exhibit no. 3 to the Maxwell deposition which is the warranty deed. Addendum I ) For 
purposes of this appeal, John S Adams (Adams Estate) and the law firm,, of TE A&L began 
representing Maxwell in the Pepperwood action on August 12, 1988 as alleged in the amended 
complaint. (R 3 72 ) 
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Maxwell, in her brief under the Facts at page 5, paragraph 5, makes the following 
representation to the court in referencing Maxwell's conveyance of the Pepperwood property to 
Trendland in September of 1987, she claims that when the transfer was accomplished, "It was 
made with Trendland*s full knowledge, with the understanding that Maxwell would continue to 
defend her ownership to the property/' There is nothing in the trial court record supporting 
these facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Even though Maxwell raises four issues for review in her argument which will be 
addressed, it is the contention of the Adams Estate and TEA&L that with the conveyance of the 
Pepperwood property to Trendland on September 23, 1987, Maxwell's claim for the loss of one-
half of the Pepperwood property is not available. She cannot claim the loss of real property she 
does not own, and therefore she has not incurred any damages as a result of the alleged conduct 
of these defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MAXWELL IS NOT ENTITLED TO ASSERT CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE ADAMS ESTATE AND TEA&L TO RE-
COVER THE PEPPERWOOD PROPERTY OR MONETARY 
DAMAGES UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED CONVEY-
ING THE PROPERTY TO TRENDLAND, INC. 
Maxwell contends under point I of her argument that she was obligated to file an 
action against the Adams Estate, TEA&L and others to recover the property or monetary 
damages because of the conveyance of the Pepperwood property to Trendland by warranty deed. 
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She cites as authority for this action U.C. A. §57-1-12 (1953). This section provides in pertinent 
part "...That the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend 
the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever." 
Maxwell sets up her argument by referencing Patricia Wade's case ("Wade case") which was 
filed against Richard C. Burke, Advance Business Equipment and Maxwell in 1984 [sic] wherein 
she sought to have the Pepperwood property declared a part of the marital estate which related 
to her divorce from Mr. Burke. She then states that while this action was pending, the 
Pepperwood property was conveyed to Trendland by warranty deed in September of 1987. She 
represents that "the conveyance was made with the full knowledge of Trendland, with the 
understanding that Maxwell would continue to defend title to the property in the ongoing lawsuit 
in her name. The goal was to successfully defend title in Maxwell's name in order that the 
property be rightfully held by Trendland." (Maxwell brief at p. 8). 
Although there is nothing in the Record to support these factual statements, her 
representation that she did not prevail in the Patricia Wade case is accurate. She claims that the 
loss incurred in this case caused her to be in breach of the warranty deed to Trendland and then 
states in her brief, "Maxwell brought the present action in order to recover damages she has 
suffered in breaching her contract with Trendland." (Maxwell brief at p. 8). 
It is important to note Maxwell makes it clear her present claims against the 
Adams Estate and TEA&L are for the purpose of recovering damages she suffered and not any 
loss incurred by Trendland. In this case, she is not defending the title of the Pepperwood 
property on behalf of Trendland against any lawful claim which is required under §57-1-12. 
Maxwell admits to conveying the Pepperwood property to Trendland and also admits she 
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received as consideration for this conveyance 90 percent of Trendland' s outstanding stock. There 
is no question that Trendland lost one-half of the Pepperwood property but not Maxwell. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "...even though a shareholder owns 
all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a fact does not authorize him to sue as 
an individual for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation." Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift and Loan Company, 596 P.2d 1028, 1031, 1032 (Utah 1979). There is nothing in 
§57-1-12 which allows Maxwell to pursue her claims and obtain the relief she is seeking in her 
Amended Complaint. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF MAXWELL BREACHED HER CONTRACT WITH 
TRENDLAND AND IS POTENTIALLY LIABLE FOR THE 
MONETARY VALUE OF THE LOST PROPERTY, SHE IS 
STILL PRECLUDED FROM PURSUING THE CLAIMS AS 
ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Maxwell argues under Point II of her brief that she owes Trendland the value of 
the property lost and this is what she is seeking in the present case. However, she totally ignores 
the criteria necessary to prove her claims against the Adams Estate and TEA&L. The elements 
of an attorney malpractice action requires that the plaintiff prove, "(1) an attorney/client 
relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages 
suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach of duty. Harline v. Barker, 
854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). See also Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988). 
The plaintiff must establish some competent evidence to support each of these elements. In this 
case, the missing element in the claims asserted by Maxwell against the Adams Estate and 
TEA&L is that she cannot establish by any competent evidence the damages she claims to have 
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incurred. There is no evidence in the trial court record that Trendland has made a claim against 
her for the value of the property lost and therefore she has not suffered any damages. However, 
Maxwell argues she is entitled to recover for an anticipated future loss in that Trendland might 
assert a claim some time in the future. As support for this contention, Maxwell cites the case 
of Walton v. City ofBozeman, 588 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1978). In this case, the city of Bozeman, 
because of its expanding city limits, closed a ditch which provided water to the property of the 
plaintiff, Roy Walton. In closing the ditch, the city installed a new diversion ditch with a culvert 
placed under a road which would bring the water to Mr. Walton's land. There was a diversion 
box with a cement structure with an iron grating and the court found that the construction of the 
diversion box at times interfered with the flow of Walton1 s water preventing it from reaching his 
land. In addition, the city had installed a storm sewer under another street which discharged its 
drainage waters through a culvert and it would eventually come upon Walton's land and, at 
times, cause flooding and pollution from the water. Based upon the flooding and damage to his 
land, Mr. Walton filed suit against the city. The court found that the city was responsible for 
the flooding and awarded Mr. Walton monetary damages for his losses. In addition, the court 
awarded Mr. Walton monetary damages for future losses until the flooding and pollution 
problems were remedied by the city. In upholding this award for future damages, the Supreme 
Court of Montana stated the following: 
It was proper for the court to award a reasonable amount of 
damages for the continuing interference with the flow of Walton's 
irrigation water, and the continuing flooding and discharge of 
polluted waters upon his land. 
"Prospective damages" are those which are reasonably certain to 
follow the state of facts on which plaintiff's suit is based; such 
damages have not yet accrued at the time of trial, but in the nature 
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things must certainly or most probably result from the state of facts 
found to be existing at the time of trial. (Citation omitted) Walton 
at 522. 
In this case, the court concluded that the facts supported an award of prospective 
damages based upon the existing facts that the Walton property would continue to have flooding 
and related problems until the city fixed the ditches which were the cause. Maxwell's claims are 
distinguishable from those of Mr. Walton. He established actual losses and that these losses 
would occur in the future as long as the flooding and related problems continued. Maxwell 
cannot establish any loss at this time, and based upon the factual allegations contained in her 
Amended Complaint against the Adams Estate and TEA&L and the existing facts, she will never 
suffer a loss of the Pepperwood property. The loss incurred is Trendland* s, and it has not taken 
any action against Maxwell under the warranty deed. Maxwell's claim for future damages are 
purely speculative which are not allowed under Utah law. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 
1983). 
POINT III 
UNDER THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT, TRENDLAND, INC. IS NOT THE REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF 
TRENDLAND, INC. FOR MAXWELL IS NOT 
APPROPRIATE 
Maxwell's attempt to utilize Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
substitute Trendland, Inc. in her place as plaintiff cannot be done in this case. Maxwell's claims 
against the Adams Estate and TEA&L are based upon alleged attorney malpractice. If Trendland 
was substituted for Maxwell to pursue the attorney malpractice claims, those claims would fail 
because Trendland cannot establish the necessary elements as set forth in Harline v. Barker, 854 
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P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1993). There is no evidence in the record that John S. Adams or the law 
firm of Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe ever had an attorney/client relationship with 
Trendland, Inc., and therefore, a substitution under Rule 17(a) would result in a dismissal of the 
pending legal malpractice claims. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING 
MAXWELL CANNOT ESTABLISH BY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE THE DAMAGE ELEMENT OF HER LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
Maxwell argues under Point IV of her brief that the Adams Estate and TEA&L 
cannot raise the issue of her ability to prove damages as a bar to her legal malpractice claims 
based upon a theory of estoppel. However, she fails to acknowledge that it was her own conduct 
that resulted in her inability to prove damages in this case. She conveyed the Pepperwood 
property to Trendland in exchange for 90 percent of its stock in September 1987, almost one 
year before John S. Adams and TEA&L began representing her in the Wade case. She benefited 
from this transaction and now is attempting to obtain monetary compensation for the loss of 
property she does not own. In fact, she did not own the property at the time the court in the 
Wade case awarded one-half of it to Patricia Wade. Trendland incurred the loss and if there is 
a claim to be made on any theory of liability against the Adams estate and TEA&L, it's 
Trendland's. Furthermore, Trendland may be barred from asserting any claims based upon the 
applicable statutes of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. §78-12-6 (1953). 
9 
Maxwell cannot establish the three elements of estoppel which are set forth in 
Ceco v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969, 970 (Utah 1989) wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three 
elements: (i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the 
first party1 s statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) 
injury to the second party that would result form allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act. 
The first two elements are not relevant because Maxwell created her own problem 
in this case when she conveyed the Pepperwood property to Trendland. In any event, Maxwell 
cannot prove the third element regarding injury. She argues that she would suffer the injury of 
losing her cause of action for legal malpractice if the Adams estate and TEA&L are allowed to 
contradict their prior actions by claiming she has no damages. However, the facts before this 
court establish that she never had a legal malpractice claim against the Adams estate and TEA&L 
because she lacked the element of damages. Therefore, her injury cannot be the loss of her 
cause of action for legal malpractice, and she has suffered no other damage. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Adams estate and TEA&L respectfully 
urge the court to affirm the summary judgment granted by the lower court. 
DATED THIS day of November, 1995. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESC 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Estate of John S. Adams by and 
through Kent M. Kasting, Personal 
Representative, and Taylor, 
Ennenga, Adams & Lowe 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA L. MAXWELL; 
RICHARD C. BURKE; and 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN T. CAINE, 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS, 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS, a 
Utah professional partnership; 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, a Utah 
professional partnership; the 
ESTATE OF JOHN S. ADAMS, by and 
through KENT M. KASTING, Personal 
Representative; and 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE, 
a Utah professional corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED) 
Civil No. 920901881 CN 
Plaintiffs complain of defendants, and, demanding trial by 
jury, seek relief as follows: 
1988) conclusively established that motions for 
reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) Entered into a Stipulation agreeing to prejudicially 
shorten the time for the August 15, 1988 hearing on 
Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment; and 
(f) Failed to ensure that Maxwell's new counsel timely filed 
a Notice of Appeal of the Court's September 7, 1988 Order 
and Judgment. 
259. As a direct and proximate result of Richards' and RC&A's 
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not 
limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having 
a value of approximately $600,000. 
260. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Richards and RC&A all 
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of 
Richards' and RC&A's negligence, including, but not.limited to, the 
damages set forth in paragraph 259 above. 
XIV 
ELEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L) 
(Breach of Contract/Pepperwood Action) 
For the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against 
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows: 
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261. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 260 set forth hereinabove. 
262. Maxwell entered into a valid contract whereby Adams and 
TEA&L agreed to provide legal services to Maxwell in exchange for 
a fee. 
263. Maxwell's contract with Adams and TEA&L, which included 
an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care, required 
Adams and TEA&L: 
(a) To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation 
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought 
against her; 
(b) To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings 
where relief was sought against Maxwell; 
(c) To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders 
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests;-
(d) To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988 
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion 
of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988) 
conclusively established that motions for reconsideration 
were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by 
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and 
56 
0 0 0 -i 0 u 
(f) To give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure 
to appeal final orders. 
264. In breach of their contract with Maxwell in the implied 
covenant of competence, diligence and due care, Adams and TEA&L 
inexcusably: 
(a) Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988 
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment; 
(b) Failed to make any argument whatsoever on Maxwell's 
behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment; 
(c) Failed to file timely notices of appeal of (1) the 
Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the 
Court's October 21, 1988 Order; and (3) the Court's 
February 17, 1989 Order; 
(d) Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided 
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 
1988) conclusively established that motions for 
reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) Failed to file any reply memorandum with respect to 
Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the 
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and 
57 
0 0 ;* J r. i 
(f) Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's 
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would 
adequately protect Maxwell from the effects of the 
Court's September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders. 
265. As a direct consequence of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of 
contract, Maxwell lost one-half of the Pepperwood Property. 
266. By reason of Adams' and TEA&L's breaches of contract, 
Maxwell has suffered damages resulting from those defendants' 
breach in an amount in excess of $600,000, plus prejudgment 
interest as provided by law, the precise amount of which will be 
established by proof at trial. 
XV 
TWELFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(AGAINST ADAMS AND TEA&L) 
(Negligence/Pepperwood Action) 
For the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell complains against 
defendants Adams' Estate and TEA&L, and alleges as follows: 
267. Maxwell realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 266 set forth hereinabove. 
268. As Maxwell's attorneys, Adams and TEA&L owed Maxwell a 
duty to represent Maxwell's interest with competence, diligence and 
due care and to possess the legal skills and knowledge common to 
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members of their profession, which included among other things, the 
duties 
(a) To be adequately prepared, upon accepting representation 
of Maxwell, to defend Maxwell against all motions brought 
against her; 
(b) To zealously defend Maxwell's interests in all hearings 
where relief was sought against Maxwell; 
(c) To timely file notices of appeal of all final orders 
adversely affecting Maxwell's interests; 
(d) To request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 1988 
Order on the grounds that the previously decided opinion 
of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 1988) 
conclusively established that motions for reconsideration 
were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) To file reply memoranda supporting motions brought by 
Adams and TEA&L on Maxwell's behalf; and 
(f) To give Maxwell proper legal advise regarding her failure 
to appeal final orders. 
269. In breach of the duties set forth above, Adams and TEA&L, 
among other things, negligently 
(a) Failed to request a continuance of the August 15, 1988 
hearing on Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment; 
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(b) Failed to make any argument whatsoever on Maxwell's 
behalf at the August 15, 1988 hearing on Wade's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment; 
(c) Failed to file timely notices of appeal of (1) the 
Court's September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; (2) the 
Court's October 21, 1988 Order; and (3) the Court's 
February 17, 1989 Order; 
(d) Failed to request the Court to reconsider its October 21, 
1988 Order on the grounds that the previously decided 
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App. 
1988) conclusively established that motions for 
reconsideration were appropriate in the circumstances; 
(e) Failed to file any reply memorandum with respect to 
Maxwell's December 28, 1988 Motion for Relief from the 
September 7, 1988 Order and Judgment; and 
(f) Incorrectly advised Maxwell through Burke that Burke's 
appeal of the Court's December 2, 1988 Order would 
adequately protect Maxwell from the effects of the 
Court's September 7, 1988 and October 21, 1988 Orders. 
270. As a direct and proximate result of Adams' and TEA&L's 
negligence, Maxwell incurred substantial damage, including, but not 
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limited to, her loss of one-half of the Pepperwood Property, having 
a value of approximately $600,000. 
271. Maxwell is entitled to recover from Adams and TEA&L all 
damages sustained by Maxwell as a direct and proximate result of 
Adams' and TEA&L's negligence, including, but not limited to, the 
damages set forth in paragraph 270 above. 
XVI 
THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(AGAINST CAINE, RC&R AND RC&A) 
(Breach of Contract/Child Support Judgments) 
For the Thirteenth Claim for Relief Burke complains against 
defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A, and alleges as follows: 
272. Burke realleges and incorporates herein by reference 
paragraphs 1 through 271 as set forth hereinabove. 
273. Burke entered into a valid contract whereby Caine, RC&R 
and RC&A agreed to provide legal services to Burke in exchange for 
a fee. 
274. Burke's contract with Caine, RC&R and RC&A, which 
included an implied covenant of competence, diligence and due care, 
required Caine, RC&R and RC&A, among other things,: 
(a) To prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
supporting the Decree in accordance with the court's 
January 5, 1984 Order in the Divorce Action, stating that 
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3. That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of 
suit. 
4. That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Eleventh Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays 
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows: 
1. That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached 
their contract with Maxwell and are, therefore, liable to Maxwell. 
2. That Maxwell have and recover from those defendants 
judgment for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the 
amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest. 
3. For an award of incidental and consequential damages 
suffered by Maxwell, including an award of Maxwell's reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in this matter. 
4. That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of 
suit. 
5. That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Twelfth Claim for Relief, Maxwell prays 
for judgment against Defendants Adams and TEA&L as follows: 
1. That defendants Adams and TEA&L be adjudicated as having 
negligently represented Maxwell. 
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2. That Maxwell have and recover from those defendants 
judgment for all damages sustained by Maxwell at least in the 
amount of $600,000, plus prejudgment interest. 
3. That Maxwell recover from those defendants her cost of 
suit. 
4. That Maxwell have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Thirteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays 
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows: 
1. That those defendants be adjudicated as having breached 
their contract with Burke and are, therefore, liable to Burke. 
2. That Burke have and recover from those defendants 
judgment for all damages sustained by Burke at least in the amount 
of $48,000, plus prejudgment interest. 
3. For an award of incidental and consequential damages 
suffered by Burke, including an award of Burke's reasonable 
attorneys' fees incurred in this matter. 
4. That Burke recover from those defendants his costs of 
suit. 
5. That Burke have such other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, under the Fourteenth Claim for Relief, Burke prays 
for judgment against Defendants Caine, RC&R and RC&A as follows: 
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Q What was the next piece of property 
okay, we've now talked about your home that you 




property that you've either purchased or received? 
A That would be the large piece, 
g Pepperwood property. 
- MR. KAY: Would you mark that. 
fl (Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KAY) I'm going to hand you, 
12 Mrs. Maxwell, Defendant's Exhibit 1 which is 
13 entitled an Assignment of Contract that was given 
14 to me by your attorney this morning. Is that your 
15 understanding, an Assignment of Contract relating 
16 to what you've described as the Pepperwood 
17 property? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q What was the date that you received an 
20 interest in the Pepperwood property? 
21 MR. HAGEN: You can look at what it 
22 "says on there if you want. 
23 THE WITNESS: 1970. 
24
 Q (BY MR. KAY) Well, I believe does it 
25 say that you received it February --
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A I'm sorry. I'm looking down here. 
Q I think that's the original Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. Is it your understanding it 
was approximately February 27th, 1976?-
A Yeah. 
MR. KIPP: What are we looking at now? 
MR. KAY: We're looking at the 
Pepperwood Assignment of Contract that's been 
marked as Exhibit 1 in the documents they gave us 
today. It's that document that you have in your 
hand . 
MR. KIPP: Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. KAY) How was it that you 
received this Pepperwood property that's been 
described in Exhibit 1 in February of 1976? 
A I'm sorry, what do you mean? 
Q Well, prior to February 27th, 1976, I 
understand that you didn't have the Pepperwood 
property; is that correct? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q Who owned the Pepperwood property 
before February 27, 1976? 
A Advance Business Equipment. 
Q And Advance Business Equipment is a 
company that your brother, Richard Burke owns; is 
ftftiKU 
1HI3 AGREEMENT, mode In the City of ("odin , S'ote of Uioh OA the • 11 XL doy of 
-..f.zk.lur-Z:* • \9.16.„ by ond between hduanUL.ZlLLljtfJ^-EoiLLaM 
_«£.<. litifi 
hif.*iU»e t*\trr%d fo ot the osiignors, ond SandlCL.l 'SJ&XI'XIJ^. a .inomrt/I _ .. 
hereinafter rctirfd te 01 the ottignees, 
WITNESSETH: 
V7.V,£«£AS. under dot* of . .ApHJJL It 19 J.CL. J L J L J F . U f t & t j C W d L ^ ^ ^ «X,<C 
at tellers, «nl*r«d into o Uniform foal Estate Confrocf with 
^dvanaLjuAlnJ^^EqsUm 
os buyers, olSott Lrthe. Gptitoh. which contract ti delivered herewith, wherein ond whereby the said sellers 
agre*d lo tell ond thj said buyers ogreed to purchose, upon iht terms, conditions, ond provisions therein I4t 
forir.. oil ihof c«rtoin lond. with tht buildings ond Improvement! thereon, erected, situate, lying ond being in 
th# County of «.?.<?^?« LcwC _ _ Slot* of Utah, ond-more porflrulorly described di Coflown 
T.'te. $ouf>. 396 /e<v£ o< the HonXJ\zcut OUDAXPA of XJie. >lo*ti'XJ>t quaAtcA of, Xhc Hoithvut 
oufiAtcA cl Section 11: the Soutli 396'feet of the Ecut one-hctf of the Ho-ithw*At qun/iteA 
of tic !:a*'!u:VA£ qwAtcA of Xl\<L VofUheaAt our.AtCA oi Sectlan 11: tlit UOAXSX 164 fert of 
Hit Tontlxeaht qiMAttA of the HoAthva>t quaAtzA ol the VoAthcjut oaaAtzA of Section 21: 
ond the Hntth 164 feet of XJxe fcut one-half of the SoiLtivvAt quflitzA of Xixe HontSvXAt 
qad\tex c.< die UoKtlxtoAt QiuntzA of Section 21. Tcv+iAhin 3 South, ?&nge 1 East, 5LfX'l. 
SUBJECT to raj>ementA, \zj>t\ictjjorj> end Kio\\t& of vnu avDemUna of KecoxA, OA cnfoicaibte 
in t/ii" nx totUtu. 
to ^K«':K o;r<rcm«nr in writing, reference It hereby mode for oil of the terms, conditions ond provisions 
lk«'4of, end 
V/HE^SAS. the ossignees des*re to ocqufre from the ossignors oil of lb* right, till* ond interest of'the 
civgnors in ond to the said written ogrcement. 
NOW. THEREFORE, It is hereby mutuolly agreed as follow*, 
1. TKot tKe ossignors In conslderotton of the Payment of Ten Dollars ond olKer good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, assign to the ossignees, oil their right, title and 
;-.!.,-.» :« -rJ . - . v . cfc-eiciJ Uniform Xeoi csrote Contract of ^T.M^_ZJL__., 1 9 - J W . „ concerning the 
olxve 4;ic.*ibed property. 
2. That to indues the ossignees to pay the soid sum of money ond to occepf the said contract, the as-
signors hereby represent to the assignee* os followst 
c. Thot 'he o»>»gr*rw» h i v * duly performed oil the conditions of the soid contract. 
b. Thar the contract is now in full force ond effect ond thot the unpold balance of said contract Is 
' S IZolUAQ.^ with* Interest paid to the JL7.tI\ day of J E x i & U & U L 1?7.$ 
3. Thnt in consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this ogreerr.ent, the assignees cove* 
nont with the ossignors os followst 
o. TKcf th« aft«gn«es will duly keep, obterse and perform oil of the terms, conditions ond provisions 
of the said agreement thot ore to be kept, obterv«d 0nd performed by the o»»ignori.' 
b. The* the cssignees will sove ond hold harmless the ossignors of ond from ony ond oil octlons, suits. 
costs, domages, claims ond demonds wholioevrr orising by reason of on oct or omission of the 
assignees. 
IN NVllNtSS V/>ttftEOF, The potties V.ereto hove hereunto set their hands ond leoh the day and year 
fin» abyv* written. 
f ,)/ / . ; I ' 
VloCavj PubUc) . J / i./l JiL . / ' 
KuicUna at Oqdzn, ttCrt/i. JL^'&rdLL-i' "* /iPst"1-' _ x 
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t h e ' 70's, or not? 
A I believe it was in the '80's. 
Q So you bought the Pepperwood property 
from the Fishers and paid payments for a few years; 
is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then in 1976, February 27, 1976, 
you assigned the contract with the Fishers to 
Sandra Maxwell; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, why did you assign the contract 
between Advance Business Equipment and the Fishers 
to Sandra Maxwell? 
A Well, for two reasons, basically. The 
company was in a little bit of a financial problem 
at that period of time and I didn't feel that the 
company would have the money to make the next 
payment to the Fishers, and we didn't want to lose 
the property entirely, so --
Q Did you have a concern that if the 
company still had the property, that creditors 
could reach it? 
A .Well, it wouldn't be creditors. It 
would just be that if we couldn't make the 
payments, that Bud Fisher would probably take the 
Transcribe America f» ft o <; 9 1 
ADDENDUM 3 
/L/A)VUec<L. b£pof/r/a& 
0t6. &, *** 
37 
A To Mrs. Fisher? 
Q Yes . 
A Yes . 
Q How many years did you make payments? 
A Oh, what, 10 years possibly. I can't 
remember exactly. 
Q After you made payments and paid off 
the contract, did you receive a Warranty Deed from 
the Fishers? 
A Yes . 
Q And you didn't produce any Warranty 
Deed today; is that correct? 
A Apparently not. 
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 2 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KAY) I'm going to hand you 
what's been marked as Exhibit 2 to your deposition, 
Mrs. Maxwell, and this is entitled Warranty Deed 
from Frances Fisher to Sandra Maxwell dated May 20, 
1983. Is Exhibit 2 the Warranty Deed that you 
received from Frances Fisher after you had paid the 
contract on Pepperwood? 
A It looks to be that. 
Q Does this refresh your memory that you 
ft ii n \ 4> '> 




Frances F i s h e r . V/ife of H. R. F i sher (deceased) 
of Sale Lake C i t y Counry of S a l t L j k c 
COSVCY and WARRANT to 
r i m o r 
State of Utah, herebv 
Sandra L. Maxwell, a woman 
of Ogden, County of Weber, S t a t e of Utah 
Ten d o l l a r s and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS 
Counrv, 
The South 396 f e e t o f the N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of the Northwest q u a r t e r o f the 
Northeast q u a r t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 2 ; the South 396 f e e t of the East o n e - h a l f of 
the Northwest q u a r t e r of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast q u a r t e r of 
S e c t i o n 22; the North 264 f e e t of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest . 
quarter of the N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 22; Znd the .North 26£ f e e t of 
chf East o n « - h a l f o f the Southwt*»t q u a r t e r of ch.» Northwest q u a r t e r of the 
Northeast q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 3 South, Range I E a s t , SLB£M 
SUBJECT to e a s e r e e n t s , r e s t r i c t i o n . * and r i g h t s of way appearing o f r e c o r d , or 
r n t o r c c a o i e in law or e q u i t y . 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this 20th 
May , A.D. 1983 
Sicncd in the Presence of 
dav of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Countv of J..J.{."f 
• ^ 
.A.D. 19 1?A On the - > 0 * s J dav of YY\CL 
pcrsonatfy appeared before me 
thc—si-s-icr of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to mc thatihe executed the 
J I . ' * - . fc. Q?/r.' /, rS ''.<*</* 
*•••* ; » \ /I ~ Notary Public. 
"• A'.v cofnmr.ijmi expires J - r\- >t l \- Residing in * \ I ( t t / / ; / / ? / 
^ 
\\\ 
r com r^rm expires 
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No. 3 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KAY) I'm going to hand you 
what's been marked as Exhibit 3 to your 
deposition. Can you tell me what that is, 
Mrs. Maxwell? Do you know what Exhibit 3 is? 
A A Warranty Deed. 
Q At some point after May of 1983, did 
you transfer your interest in the Pepperwood 
property to a corporation called Trendland, Inc.? 
A Yes . 
Q And was that approximately September 
23rd, 1987? 
A Yes, uh-huh. 
Q Did you sign this deed and have it 
notarized on September 23rd, 1987? 
A Yes . 
Q That is your signature under the date? 
A Yes . 
Q Why did you transfer this property 
through Exhibit 3, the Warranty Deed to Trendland, 
Inc. in September of 1987? 
A Well, we had hopes of developing the 
piece of property. 
Q Who is we? 
ft (HI v, 9 ! 
u 
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A Myself and the -- myself principally. 
MR. KIPP: I'm not able to hear you. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 
MR. HAGEN: Do you want to repeat. 
Q (BY MR. KAY) Let me ask the question 
again. Why did you transfer the Pepperwood 
property to Trendland, Inc. in September of 1987? 
A We had hopes of developing the piece of 
property. 
Q And when you say we, are you only 
referring to yourself or someone else? 
A Well, primarily, at first myself. 
Q What was Trendland, Inc.? 
A It was a corporation. 
Q Is this a corporation that you were an 
of ficer in? 
A No. I had primarily most of the -- the t 
majority -- I shouldn't say most, I should say the 
majority of the stock in Trendland. 
Q Were you an officer or director in 
Trendland at the time that you conveyed the 
Pepperwood property to Trendland in September of 
1987? 
A I don't believe so, no. 
Q How much money were you paid by 
'
v
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A Yes, he did. 
Q Okay, when? 
A Well, I don't know the exact time that 
^e first started to represent me. I don't know. I 
thought it was in 1978 sometime. 
Q Do you have any explanation why your 
wife's attorney sent you a Motion for Sanctions on 
December 14, 1978 instead of sending it to John 
Caine? 
A I don't know the answer to that. 
Q We were talking about the Pepperwood 
case before lunch, Mr. Burke, and I believe you 
said that Trendland paid the property taxes on 
Pepperwood; is that correct? 
A Trendland paid the rollback taxes on 
the Pepperwood property. 
Q Of approximately $30,000? 
A Approximately. I don't know the exact 
amount. 
Q How did the Trendland Corporation come 
about? Whose idea was it? 
A Well, it was Sandra Maxwell's. She 
wanted the property into a corporation which would 
take some of the pressure off her, and she also 
wanted to have it in a vehicle for future 
TranScribe America 0 0 0 S 2 6 
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development. So it was because of that that I 
initially started Trendland and we had the property 
put into Trendland. 
Q Can you tell me how putting the 
Pepperwood property in a corporation was going to 
take pressure off of Sandra Maxwell? 
A Well, she wouldn't directly own the 
property any more, not directly. She would 
indirectly because she was such a large 
stockholder, she could receive stock from the 
corporation from putting the property into it. 
Q What did Sandra Maxwell get for putting 
the Pepperwood property into the Trendland 
Corporation? 
A Shares of stock. 
Q And what were the shares of stock of 
Trendland worth when she put the property into it? 
A Well, the shares of stock would have to 
be set up as to the value or were set up as to the 
value of the property at the time that she put the 
property in, and I don't recall what that value was 
at that time at all. 
Q Okay, the incorporators of Trendland, 
Inc. were Richard Burke, Maury Burke and Pamela 
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a director? 
,* MR. HAGEN: I'm going to object, 
foundation. I don't think he can testify as to 
what his sister knows. 
THE WITNESS: I really can't. I don't 
know that. 
Q (BY MR. KAY) Was your sister the only 
g shareholder of Trendland, Inc.? 
• A No. The other people that came in as 
|0 officers and directors were given shares of stock 
jl in the corporation. 
jj| Q How many shares of stock was your 
j3 sister given when Trendland, Inc. was formed? 
14 A I believe it was 50,000. 
j5 Q How many shares were you given? 
16 A I wasn't given any. 
17 Q How many shares were any of the other 
18 officers or directors given? 
19 A At the time the corporation was formed, 
20 there was none given out. 
a? 
21 Q At any time after the corporation was 
r 
22 formed, were any of the officers or directors given 
23 shares in Trendland, Inc.? 
24 A Yes, they were. 
25 Q Were you g i v e n any? 
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Ref.t. 
SANDRA L. MAXWELL, A WOMAN 
of Ogden, County of 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
TRENDLAND INC. 
WARRANTY DEED 
County of Weber 
grantor 
State of Utah, hereby 
of SALT LAKE CITY County SALT LAKE 
for the turn of Ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration 
grantee 
State of Utah 
DOLLARS 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
County, 
The South 396 feet of the Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 22; the South 396 feet of the East one-half of 
the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section 22; the North 264 feet of the Southeast quarter of the Northwest 
quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22; and North 264 feet of the 
East one-half of the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 3 South, Range 1 East. SLB&M 
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions and rights of way appearing of record, or 
enforceable In law or equity. 
i o9 
21 SEKEWlf. 8? OiiA] PR 
K A T I E L . DXXON 
RECORDED £AU LAKE COUNTY, U7A1I 
TKENOLAMO INC. 
P.O. POX cv35 SLC UT L'ilW 
REC BY: REBECCA GfcAf . OLKUf 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 
Signed in the presence of 
23^ *,„>&/** A. D. 19 P^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
C O U N T T , ^ ^ 
My Commission Expires: 
i SS. 
On the ^ J ' ^ a y o f dtf*Z~*^ A. D. 1 9 / 7 
appeared before roe ^-A^^.J^. ^lf tyl+~Z~~>JZJ£-' 
the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
personally 
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